Bussart, the hearing officer, indicated that the board had refused to accept Bussart's recommendation of dismissal.
Harrison, Jean Ely, a parent, and Ford T. In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees presented a memorandum and a number of affidavits and depositions which bore upon the causation issue. We agree with the Pennsylvania Court's analogy: "* * * An action for interference with another's contract is, in a way, analogous to the old action for alienation of affections, in which, of course, there was no liability if the affections, though lost, were not alienated by the alleged tortfeasor." Wahl v.
2d 715, 717 (1959) (plaintiff must establish by evidence that the employment was terminated because of the defendant's acts). The defendant can be held liable, however, only if he causes the loss. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 972(1979) Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. This court has recognized an action for intentional interference with contractual relations is allowable. But of course if there is no genuine issue as to causation, a summary judgment is not thereby precluded. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766, comment o. If the cause is disputed, it is an issue of fact. Causation is a material element in a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. * * *" Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.Īppellant argues the determination of the cause of his discharge from employment is an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSĪ summary judgment "* * * shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together *190 with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On August 12, 1982, the board issued findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its determination to discharge appellant based on the May 5 incident. A hearing in that matter was held June 23 and 24, 1982. A separate proceeding before the board based on this incident was initiated on May 27, 1982. Board of Trustees, Carbon County School District No. The details of this incident are fully set forth in Spurlock v. Meanwhile appellant was involved in an altercation with two teachers on May 5, 1982. The board, however, rejected Bussart's recommendation and did not discharge appellant. However, he found two allegations serious enough to justify termination. Inter alia, Bussart found many of the allegations against appellant harmless or insubstantial others, unfounded. Based upon his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Bussart recommended to the board that they terminate appellant.
That hearing began on March 29, 1982, before hearing officer Ford T. On December 11, 1981, the board notified the appellees that a hearing concerning appellant's fitness to function as a principal would be held. Harrison is the attorney who represented the rest of the appellees in bringing their complaints to the attention of the board.Īcting as the group's attorney, Harrison wrote to the school board on September 2, 1981, concerning the allegations against appellant. All the appellees save Harrison are individual parents, students and teachers who addressed complaints against appellant to the board of trustees of that district. We affirm.Īppellant is the former principal of Morrow School, the high school in Baggs, Wyoming, and was employed by Carbon County School District No. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, former employees and parents of former students, holding that as a matter of law the information furnished to the school board by those persons did not cause the school board to discharge the principal and holding that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, being dependent upon recovery on the claim for malicious interference with the principal's contract, must fail. Nyles Spurlock, a former school principal, brought an action against appellees for intentional interference with contractual relations and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. McKellar, Lathrop & Uchner, and William Walton, Cheyenne, for appellees.īefore THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. Moller, Aron & Hennig, Laramie, for appellant.īernard Q. Harrison, Bruce Harvey, Kathy McCracken, Mary Morehouse, Juana Morse, Doe I, and Doe II, Appellees (Defendants),Īnna Mae Adams and Lois Wren, (Defendants). Jean ELY, Fran Everson, Mary Fleming, Connie Foster, Daryl Garvin, Frederick J.